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Vol. 3, No. 12, January 2005
Table of Content
To Our Readers
For the New Democracies with
Optimism
Philip Dimitrov
In Search of Strategy in the
Draft of Security Strategy of Bulgaria
Blagovest Tashev
Security vs Privacy
Monika Kopcheva
The European Union in the Middle
East Peace process
Kamen Velichkov
The Issue of the Transparency
and Accountability of CFSP/ESDP
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
Organizations
Publications and Projects
Events
TO OUR READERS
This is the twelfth issue
of Security Focus and Security Sector Watch. In this issue's
first article, Philip Dimitrov points out the challenges facing
the New democracies and draws important conclusions concerning
the countries which only now set on the same way.
Blagovest Tashev proposes his assessment of
the draft of the Security Strategy of Bulgaria, adopted by
the Council of Ministers on January 7, 2005. The analysis
offers a number of specific questions, including the security
sector transformation, the role of institutional powers in
the national security system, prioritization of threats and
national security policies.
Monika Kopcheva presents the new security trends
introduced by the EU Member countries in their legislative
and operational measures, imposed by the new security risks.
Bulgarian security policy is still underestimating peacetime
security threats. The difficulties our legislators will come
across in that regard are related to the balance needed with
the protection of human rights incl. privacy and freedom of
information.
Kamen Velitchkov analyzes the efforts of the
European Union trying to find solution of the Middle East
crisis and to guarantee the security and peaceful development
of Israel, the future Palestinian State and the entire region.
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski offers his view on the
lack of transparency and accountability of the CFSP/ESDP,
trying to analyze the reason for the existing 'democratic
deficit'.
Our team, together with Vessela Tcherneva from
the Center for Liberal Strategies offers you a short review
of a number of new organizations, publications and projects
related to security sector.
We welcome your opinions about the content of
this newsletter. You can find all the preceding issues at
http://www.mediapool.bg/site/security/
From the publishers
For
the New Democracies with Optimism
Philip Dimitrov*
The term "New democracies"
originated in Washington almost at the same time with the
term "Big bang", indicating NATO expansion to the
Vilnius group of countries. (It did irritate many, but after
45 or 75 years of communist rule any kind of democracy would
by necessity be considered new).
The term came to indicate two very important
things: first, that among the former communist countries similarities
are much more than differences and second, that they could
provide the basis for solidarity and possible joint action.
The instinctive resistance against this opportunity
was a source that inspired many writings on "the failure
of transition in the former communist states", on "the
damages suffered" while attempting to transform the bankrupt
economic system into a market one, on the "facade democracy"
established (at least in some of them) in the place of dictatorship.
These pessimistic writings are the natural reaction
of three factors apparent in some of the New democracies:
- uncertain (or at least slow) establishment of the rule of
law and high level of corruption;
- frustration caused by the winding course of economic changes
and the yet remaining low standard of living;
- manifestation of an attitude of cynicism by the majority
of politicians and voters vis a vis fundamental elements of
the western system of values.
These concrete problems find expression differing
in its degree in different countries and reflect a multitude
of factors starting from the good reputation of the country
via the level of sabotage of the process of transition by
the former communist parties, to the rapid and correct (respectively
slow and incorrect) assessment on behalf of the governing
structures. Leaving aside the smallest among these states,
like Estonia and Slovenia, which combined an easy engagement
with neighboring economies with low level of internal confrontation,
the comparison between Hungary and Bulgaria simply suggests
its self by way of illustration.
The first one was known as the country, which
as far back as 1956 opposed communism. The second - as the
closest satellite of the Soviet Union.
In the first one, the communist party opened
the borders and set to changes. In the second - the communist
party fought tooth and nail to come into power, overthrew
the first democratic government, and then, being in power
realized a second bankruptcy of the state thus substantially
delaying the rising of the standard of living.
The first one has sold of with lightening speed
and "on the cheap" the property of the state and
it was the foreign investors that turned out to be the decisive
factor to set the rules of the market and hence to withhold
widespread corruption and organized crime. The second being
in bondage to its fantasies of the preciousness of its outdated
economy, delayed selling, to get the "real price"
thus leaving room for the activities of companies of questionable
reputation, supported by secret police or other communist
party units. The last one proved to be particularly damaging
as the typical for the Soviet block ties of the secret communist
police with organized crime and terrorism had a strong impact
pushing the economy towards criminalization and enhancing
of the corruption.
Notwithstanding the evident difference, however
the challenges facing the New democracies are one and the
same. Besides the privatization that has already been effected
to a great extent, somewhere better, elsewhere worse - the
lasting problems facing New democracies are the ones, the
solution of which makes them a part of the Euro-Atlantic world.
They include:
1. Democratic judiciary, rule of law and getting
control of corruption.
2. Protection of human rights and dignity of minorities.
3. Contribution to the transatlantic link and security.
Each of these problems is worthy of consideration
of its own. It is more important however, that there is not
even one of them that could not be solved by the means available
to the New democracies.
Therefore, a point can be stated that until
now, transition did not fail in any of these former communist
countries, that had once declared their choice in favor of
the Euro-Atlantic world. The ones facing gravest difficulties:
Albania, Macedonia and to a certain degree Romania haven't
lost their hopes. Romania is already a NATO member and would
most likely be an EU member in the coming two or three years
whereas the Atlantic and European integration is the winning
factor for the irreversibility of the process.
This brings to the following two conclusions:
a) the route the New democracies had chosen
is the right one. Difficulties and delays on the way are unavoidable
and some of them would be quicker and more effective than
others, but ultimately the results are the same.
b) the countries which only now set out on the same way could
draw many lessons from the experience of their forerunners,
but they could hardly avoid most of the natural problems of
transition: corruption, ambiguity of rules, impending confrontation.
Until now the speed of introduction of economic
and institutional changes proved to be of greatest importance.
It depends predominantly on two things - the degree of preparation
and the lessons learned by democrats, and the resistance of
former communists. What could drastically delay or cease it,
is the outbreak of inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflicts.
* Philip
Dimitrov was the Prime Minister of the first democratically
elected government of Bulgaria after the fall of Communism
(1991-1992), Permanent Representative of Bulgaria at the UN
(1997-1998), Ambassador of Bulgaria to the US (1998-2002)
and a Special envoy of the OSCE Chairman-in-office to Nagorni
Karabah (2004).
In
Search of Strategy in the Draft of Security Strategy of Bulgaria
Blagovest Tashev
On January 7, 2005 the Council of Ministers
adopted a draft of Security Strategy of Bulgaria through 2015.
The document is expected to be approved by the parliament
and thus substitute the outdated National Security Concept
of the Republic of Bulgaria, adopted in 1998.
In the 5th and 8th issues of this newsletter
we published articles discussing the need for a new national
security strategy. The pieces also delineated the main parameters
and elements of the future strategy. It was noted that the
document must have a clear focus and goals and must contain
the following elements:
- Definition of national security interests
and goals;
- Definition of the main parameters of the international security
environment, including main threats, risks, challenges and
opportunities;
- Definition of the policies to attain national goals and
interests in the security environment.
This article attempts to assess whether the
draft of the Security Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria
(SSB) stands to achieve these goals and contains the main
elements of a modern national security strategy.
The publication national security strategies
is only a recent tradition, quite different from the practice
of the states before the Second World War to keep secret their
goals in the area of security and especially the means to
attain them. Even nowadays, many states-among them democratic
countries like France and Great Britain-do not formulate such
documents. Nevertheless, this practice, leading to more transparency,
accountability and democratic control, became widespread after
1989 in Eastern Europe. Most post-communist countries initially
formulated and published formal documents pertaining to security-called
concepts, strategies or doctrines-whose goal was to declare
a change in the foreign policy orientation of the state and
to define integration in the West as the key national priority.
In other words, the 0main objective of these documents was
not so much to define in detail the country's national security
policy but rather to make a political statement about the
nation's break from the East the its integration in the Euro-Atlantic
institutions. This was one of the main goals of the National
Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria approved in 1998.
The Concept marked the end of Bulgaria's ambiguity towards
NATO and made a membership in the Alliance the priority of
the country's foreign and security policy. In other words,
Bulgaria declared its intention to join not just Europe-political
unattainable then and now goal-but rather become a member
of the Euro-Atlantic community. With the gradual integration
of Eastern Europe in the EU and NATO, however, the role of
the national security strategy as simply a political statement
about a foreign policy orientation is obviously exhausted.
Instead, the main role of the formal strategy is to formulate
specific goals in the area of security and, more importantly,
the means to attain them.
In the very beginning the documents declares
that "the Security Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria
includes an assessment of the security environment and the
risks and threats to national interests and goals in the next
decade as well as the policies to attain them. While the first
part of the draft SSRB is relatively well conceived (we must
note the contribution made by non-governmental organizations
to the last version of the draft), the part concerning "the
policy to attain national security interests and goals"
is an obvious failure, which ultimately makes this document
irrelevant. In fact, it is hard to discuss the "policy"
as the document contains no policy elements. Furthermore,
even if we are to assume that the draft contains any policy,
it still does not make sense to adopt such document at the
end of this parliament's mandate. The normal practice requires
that ambitious strategies in any area are adopted at the beginning
of a mandate to govern.
In the first part, the draft defines well the
main tendencies in the current security environment and formulates
security related national interests. In fact, in this part,
the document does not stray from similar strategies produced
in the West, including those of the United States and the
European Union. As a positive element in the document, it
must be noted the definition of national interests and the
attempt to formulate goals and principles of the national
security strategy. However, this is the last positive contribution
the draft makes. The next element-the definition of strategy
to attain interests and goals based on the already identified
principles-is simply absent. In other words, it is unclear
how these goals are to be attained.
In the last few years, the reform of the national
security system-also know in Bulgaria as security sector reform
(SSR)-is frequently present in policy programs and political
statements related to security. Integration in NATO and the
EU, and especially the changes following September 11, 2001
made it widely accepted that the security sector needs a major
reform. Nevertheless, the draft of SSRB includes the word
"reform" only twice-once in the context of the need
for reform in the UN and the second time in relation to the
democratic reforms in the CIS. This is indicative of the authors'
view towards the state of the existing national security system.
Apparently, according to them the system is good and what
it needs is simply more of the same. If this is the case,
it is unclear why Bulgaria will need a new security strategy.
That Bulgaria is already a member of NATO and
in three years is about to join the EU in no way means that
the security sector is reformed and capable to function effectively.
Integration in NATO led to reform in the defense system, which
is only a part of the security sector. In other words, it
did not led to reform in the other structures of the security
sector. As far as the EU, membership criteria contain relatively
few specific requirements for changes in the security system,
compared to the economy for example. In other words, membership
in both institutions does not attest to the state of the national
security system. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the most
serious criticism toward the pace of reform in Bulgaria coming
from the EU is related to security including regarding corruption,
organized crime and the justice system.
The draft does not propose one of the most important
policies in the area of security - security sector transformation.
The document does not provide answers to many important questions
including:
- How to transform the security sector? The
draft points out that "the Strategy includes the main
principles, approaches and mechanisms in the integration of
institutional functions." Yet there is no single sentence
on what that means or on how to achieve this integration.
It is unclear what the integration process entails - either
centralization or decentralization; building horizontal structures
or hierarchies; freeing institutions from excessive functions
or limiting the number of institutions involved in the process.
Furthermore, simply discussing the need for reforms will not
suffice as reform means different things to different people.
The purpose of such document is not simply to identify the
need for reform but also to describe it and thus preclude
different interpretations of the things to come. In other
words, the Strategy must be a real agenda for specific changes.
- What is the role of the institutional powers in the national
security systems? The document points out to the role of the
citizens, but says nothing of the role of the Parliament,
for example. There is no mention of the Prime-Minister's National
Security Council and the President's National Consultative
Council on National Security. Instead there is a general discussion
about the roles of the state, the society and the citizen.
While it could be speculated as to what the role of the state
might be, it is unclear what the role of the citizen should
be.
- The document does not prioritize the threats to national
security. Priority threats require priority policies and priority
investments. Everything can't be a priority. Even the wealthiest
states, possessing powerful institutions and resources, define
some threats as the most intensive and accordingly concentrate
more efforts in confronting them.
- The document does not prioritize policies in the national
security system and does not identify the institutions requiring
priority reform and investments.
- The documents does not identify policies that Bulgaria can
implement on its own and policies that require allied and
partner cooperation due to limited national resources in certain
areas.
- The document does not discuss the human resources. Assuming
that there are fundamental changes in the security environment
which require a transformation of the security sector, it
is only logical to expect the need for a new human factor
policy in the sector.
- The draft does not discuss the delicate balance between
the need for security and the requirement for freedom and
human rights.
- The document does not speak of reforms in the intelligence
community and the police although it mentions of the reform
in the armed forces. The text conveys that the Ministry of
Defense is the only agent of change in the security system
as no other institution finds its place in the document, including
the Ministry of Interior, Civil Protection State Agency, the
justice system, diplomacy, etc. While reform process in the
Ministry of Defense had its Plan-2004 and currently has a
new Plan-2015 as a result of the recently completed Strategic
Defense Review, no other institution in the security sector
has its own reform plan.
- The document lacks priority deadlines for the next few years
including restructuring the intelligence community, building
the crisis management system, professionalization of the armed
forces, force modernization, etc. The only positive exception
is the requirement the National Assembly to approve a reports
on national security in the he first quarter of every year.
The proposed draft needs significant improvements.
While the first part of the document, with a few additions,
meets its purpose, the second part has no meaningful contribution
to the national security policy. At the end, the draft appears
as yet another political statement on the foreign policy orientation
of the country while proposing no specifics on policy. In
other words, the word "strategy" in the title of
the document is a misleading.
Security
vs Privacy
Monika Kopcheva
During the Cold War the security policy
of most states was mainly focused on counteraction against
possible military attacks on their territory. Today the range
of possible threats became broader and besides military invasion
and territorial attacks, state security could face attacks
differing in their nature such as domestic disturbances, trade,
financial, energetical attacks, attacks on information and
communication technologies and attacks on critical infrastructures.
Their diversification and complication during the last years
have lead to the modification of security policy content and
to the development of new security trends, which imposed the
need of implementation of new security measures and totally
new approaches focused on the protection of civil population
in the peacetime conditions.
Following these processes, most of the EU countries
created and introduced a broad range of legislative and operational
measures aiming at strengthening of the judicial mechanisms
and harmonizing anti-terrorist procedures in the Member-states.
The new security situation has justified the application of
a number of security measures as communications interception
and others, which were previously largely opposed due to their
intrusive nature. However, today this negative attitude was
overcome not only as result of the September 11 events, but
also as result of the shift from a "reactive" model
of security to a "pro-active" one, where citizens'
security can be assured only through the provision of "new"
powers to law enforcement agents and government, limiting
some of the citizens' rights and freedoms. The new measures
responded to the urgent demand for safer environment and facilitated
the development of the information society. Furthermore, their
application was resonated by the role they were envisaged
to play in the fight against data (including personal one)
misuse and cyber crimes and by the new security policies,
aligned with the emerging high technologies.
The analysis of security policies stresses upon
the importance of human factor in the fight against crime
and terrorism, not only as security agents, but also as consumers
of e-services and Internet. In modern world the scale of computer
crimes and especially identity thefts is growing tremendously,
so all Internet consumers could be exposed to the risk of
facing these privacy risks in practice. Thus, they should
be aware of the nature of the new security threats and well
educated to protect better their interests from the attacks
or how to react and whom to contact in case of emergency.
The future safety of information society demands the clear
indication of all privacy threats posed by new technologies
before citizens and adoption of specific regulation especially
in the cases in which the existing legislation seems to be
too vague or insufficient.
Therefore, states have to prevent their citizens
from facing further risk of not receiving an adequate protection
of their interests, because of the lack of harmonized regulation
on the problem on European level. Supervising mechanisms should
be established to ensure the protection of citizens' rights
and to avoid unnecessary intrusion in their private sphere
when privacy invasive measures are undertaken by governmental,
law-enforcement or private organizations. Corresponding measures
should also be introduced in all the related fields, such
as development and standardization of new digital evidence
tools, methods for their use and legal acceptance in the judicial
processes, before the court, procedural guarantees for efficient
and transparent crime prosecution.
In some countries it was proposed that the implementation
of measures, aiming at the enhancement of security such as
use of ID cards with biometric information and PIN numbers
for access to governmental services; smart card for asylum
seekers, containing up-to-date photograph, electronic-fingerprint,
name and nationality of holder; smart passports with biometric
chips; creation of schemes for sharing of data between Traffic
police and passport agencies. However, there are still many
issues to be solved for the improvement of the current situation,
especially in the field of EU privacy regulation, which due
to the lack of horizontal effect deprives EU citizens of the
right of a complaint against other citizens, employers and
commercial entities.
International developments in the security sphere
have influenced Bulgaria as well. Although the country did
not face any immediate security threats that could be compared
with what have happened in the USA and Spain, many concerns
were expressed with respect to the current level of preparedness
to confront attacks of various kinds. Assessment of the Bulgarian
security policy has shown that the country still underestimates
the peacetime security threats such as terrorism, cyber-crimes,
and attacks over critical infrastructure. Òhe existing risks
analyses are too vague in their nature, insufficient and with
respect to certain security risks are even missing. The existing
legal framework as well does not provide adequate regulation
on the responsibility in case of peacetime security emergencies
- which institutions should be engaged in, to what extent
and which recourses they could use, what should their operational
competence be and finally - what should be the amount from
the state budget allocated for covering the expenses, arising
in these cases.
Although the new Bill on crisis management shows
the intent of the country to make steps forward, it is far
from being sufficient. The legislation in this sphere requires
amendments of all the security-related laws, their harmonization
with the EU standards as well as implementation corresponding
to the best practices. The difficulties our legislators will
come across are related to the balance needed between the
protection of human rights, mainly privacy and freedom of
information, as the new security situation shows that the
particular nature of threats imposes their limitation. Furthermore,
being constitutionally protected such a limitation should
not only be reasonable, but provided by law and justified
by the pressing needs for protection of society interests.
It is clear that the new security situation requires changes
both in the legal basis and institutional framework. Authorities
should exercise coordination and management functions of peacetime
security threats on the basis of legislation. There could
also be observed a shift of the powers, previously executed
chiefly by the Ministry of Defense and some other state agencies,
as a result of fact that they have the competencies to act
in war-time only, which is not the case with new threats.
These changes require careful examination and
consideration of the existing security models and practices
in the EU Member-states. The initiative of a number of key
security and information experts, supported by OSI should
be mentioned in this respect, studying and analyzing foreign
experience as well as the best practices in the field of public
information management in defense and security sphere. The
main objective of the project is to show how to balance the
constitutionally guaranteed human rights in democratic society,
the needs for effective and transparent management of resource,
invasive security measures and civil control. The preliminary
conclusions stress on the fact that resolution of existing
security problems depend to a great extent on the successful
transformation of current system and the execution of serious
legal, organizational and technical changes, taking into account
the great importance of human rights protection and foreign
models of information and information technologies management,
corresponding to the current level of societal development
and security needs.
The European
Union in the Middle East Peace process
Kamen Velichkov*
Dramatic events occurred in the Middle
East in the course of the last few weeks - the funeral of
Yasser Arafat**, followed by a pre-election campaign leading
to the voting for a new President of the Palestinian Authority,
alongside with the governmental crises in Israel, triggered
by the prospects for implementation of the Sharon disengagement
plan. The change attracted public attention all over the world
and revived speculations about a possible re-launch of the
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). In this context the European
Mediterranean policies deserve a closer scrutiny and analysis.
A new European Commission took over and it is capable of influencing
to a considerable degree the EU policies in the Middle East.
The Netherlands, currently chairing the EU, initiated an important
meeting in The Hague between the EU member states and the
Mediterranean Partners. Experts on both sides of the Atlantic
try to assess whether and how the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) might produce an impact on the complex Middle
East situation.
It would be a truism to remind the controversies
that surround the topic of the EU involvement in the Middle
East settlement. The debate had been re-invigorated in September
2000, while the second Palestinian intifada was unfolding
in the territories. The European Union had managed to formulate
a distinct common position in favor of the peaceful co-existence
of two States, Israel and a viable and democratic Palestinian
State, living side by side in peace and security, in accordance
with international legitimacy and within recognized borders.
This fundamental position, alongside with the resolute condemnation
of terrorism and violence, permeates a long list of consequential
European Council declarations, beginning with the Berlin Declaration
of 24 March 1999 until the more recent EU stand on the separation
wall erected by Israel on the territories.
With the gradual build-up of the CFSP institutional
capacity, the European Union established the post of the Special
Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (EUSR), a
post initially held by Miguel Angel Moratinos, the current
Foreign Minister for Spain. In July 2003, Marc Otte, the former
Belgian Ambassador to Israel, succeeded him in this position.
In addition, the High Representative Javier Solana contributed
his input to the EU policy with regard to the MEPP, alongside
with such impressive personalities as the former EC President
Romano Prodi and former Commissioner Chris Patten. The recently
adopted European Security Strategy defined regional conflicts
as the third most compelling security threat following terrorism
and WMD proliferation, the Israeli - Palestinian conflict
being the most protracted and the most profound one.
The European Union found its place in the various
frameworks for sponsoring the Middle East negotiations, notably
in the Quartet, comprising of the United States, the EU, the
United Nations and the Russian federation, that produced the
Road map to peace. The lasting Middle East conflict endangers
both the common principles and values, on which the EU was
found, and the particular national interests of most of its
member states. There is every reason to believe that together
with the main mediator - the United States, the EU will continue
to exert pressure on the belligerents to return to the negotiation
table.
Ever since the Madrid Conference and the historical
breakthrough, achieved through the Oslo accords, Europe conscientiously
fulfilled its role - to secure conditions and international
environment conducive to a stable peace in the region. The
European efforts were complementary and ran parallel to the
bilateral political negotiations under American aegis. Once
the potential of the Oslo process had been exhausted, however,
the EU came to the conclusion that in the absence of an authentic
peace it was impossible to tackle successfully the tasks of
economic recovery of the Palestinian territories. Under the
circumstances the EU began to assume political tasks, albeit
limited to crises management through the channels of multilateral
diplomacy. Generally speaking, Europe focused its attention
to three main areas: financial and economic support to the
peace process; strengthening of regional security within multilateral
frameworks, and the creation of the institutions of the emerging
Palestinian state.
In the years 1993-2001 the EU and its member
states provided the bulk of the technical assistance to the
Palestinian Authority and the regional multilateral co-operation.
The European Commission allocated for the purpose 1.42 billion
Euro. The EU targeted three priorities: enabling economic
development of the West Bank and Gaza; capacity-building and
budget support for the Palestinian Authority (PA); fostering
joint action of civic society organizations from Israel and
the territories.
A fair amount of EU investment was directed
to infrastructure, in projects such as the Gaza airport and
harbor, and the setting up of the legal framework of market
economy. However, the economic dividends from the peace process
did not materialize. In 1996 the unemployment rate was by
30 percent higher than in 1992, while the per head income
decreased by 35 percent. Many experts found the explanation
for these unfavorable developments in the newly introduced
Israeli closure policies that deprived Palestinian workers
from access to their workplace in Israel and Jerusalem. After
the re-occupation of the territories in the summer of 2002,
the EU had to re-direct its programs from development assistance
to humanitarian aid. The European Union faced a serious dilemma:
through its humanitarian operations it actually financed the
expenses that otherwise should have been paid by the occupying
power. At the same time the European Union insisted that the
questionable Israeli practices should be terminated.
In the initial phase of the Palestinian Authorities,
the direct budget support from the EU funds led to a positive
trend whereas in 1998, the PA budget was nearly balanced.
The PA had been able to cover its expenditure through taxes,
duties and the money collected by the Israeli authorities
and then transferred to the PA under the terms of the Paris
Economic Protocol. When Israel retained the transfers of up
to 700 million dollars (due by mid-2002) the Palestinian budget
found itself on the bring of collapse. Once again the EU had
to intervene and to offer 10 million Euro per month to ensure
the payment of wages of civil servants - school teachers,
policemen and other state employees. Again the EU faced a
paradoxical dilemma: how to make it clear that financial support
for the PA did not mean approval, whatsoever of its performance
in dealing with violence. All the more that Brussels never
perceived the apparatus of Palestinian self-government as
effective and efficient.
In supporting joint projects of Israeli and
Palestinian NGO-s in water management, environment and commerce,
the objective of the EU was to spread out the spirit of understanding.
Probably such joined endeavors influenced positively the limited
number of participants, although most of them cherished no
prejudice to co-operation from the very outset of the projects.
For the much greater part of the Palestinian population however,
equal partnership with Israelis remained an illusion, easily
dispelled by the everyday life, where the asymmetric relations
of domination continued to prevail.
The experience acquired by the EU with regard
to the Palestinian reform constitutes a valuable assets and
an advantage for the Union in comparison to other international
factors. The EU took part in reforming almost every sphere
of Palestinian public life, including public finances and
the security services. It helped create the Fundamental Law
and the Law on the judicial system. In March 2003 the Office
of the Prime Minister came into existence, although the scope
of the powers the post was vested with, was defined after
a heated debate and obstructions. The new parliamentary elections
are scheduled for the coming April. They will finish the cycle
of re-elections of Palestinian authorities that will begin
with the presidential elections on January 8, 2005. There
are good chances that a new generation of Palestinian political
leaders will take over. They will be expected to direct the
transition towards the modernization of the political process
and the economic recovery on the territories.
To ensure a more stable and predictable regional
environment, the EU had developed two multilateral frameworks:
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), or Barcelona process,
and the multilateral working groups of the Madrid process,
notably the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG).
The EMP was never conceptualized as a vehicle towards Middle
East peace settlement. It was designed as a complementary
framework where the antagonists could build up trust. The
peace building effect of EMP was mainly due to the provision
of a multilateral regional format for comprehensive co-operation
in the political and economic field, including over issues
like human rights and international security.
From the outset the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
made a direct contribution to the MEPP, as it legitimized
the Palestinian Authority as an equal partner, and also ensured
the Arab states' acceptance of Israel as a participant in
the process. However, the Barcelona process did not prove
to be an efficient instrument for crises management. Later
Syria and Lebanon boycotted the November 2000 Marseilles and
the April 2002 Valencia meetings in protest to Israeli policies
on the West Bank.
Confidence building measures were stalled. "The
Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Security" did not
materialize. The EMP, instead of being a safety net to the
MEPP, became itself intoxicated by the stalemate in the Oslo
and the Madrid processes. Similar fate was in store for the
EU-led REDWG, notwithstanding the creation of the Group's
permanent secretariat in Amman and the endless attempts of
the EC experts to prove the interconnected nature of the economies
in the region.
With the advent of the new European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP) substantial changes will occur in its Mediterranean
dimension. It would be designed to project greater stability
in the region and to provide an impetus for development and
democratization. The initiative of Spain calling for an Alliance
of the Western and Arab/Islamic Civilizations may prompt an
EU joint approach and broader participation.
In the course of the last four years the EU
achieved tangible diplomatic successes in the Middle East.
European politicians and diplomats helped dissuade a number
of acute crises: the terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv in June
2001, the Church of Nativity debacle in Bethlehem, the air
attacks on Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah. Later, when
no official contacts were possible any longer, Switzerland
and the EC encouraged the second track diplomacy through agreements
negotiated by non-governmental organizations. The Geneva Accord
brought Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo back to the negotiating
table. The two former chief negotiators in the Taba talks,
assisted at the time by EUSR Moratinos, met again in Geneva
to put the final touches on the blueprint of the future comprehensive
agreement. Other distinguished personalities from Israel and
from the West Bank followed that example. Thus the Ayallon
- Nusseibah agreement defined the parameters of a compromise
over Jerusalem and the right of return of the Palestinian
refugees.
Migel Angel Moratinos, the EU Special Envoy,
managed to establish the EU/Israel Forum within which practical
problems of the bilateral co-operation found their solution.
At the same time Alister Crook, a British diplomat, managed
to convince various Palestinian fractions to renounce terrorism.
Such small but very useful steps have considerable importance
as they help dissuade the allegation, that the EU was biased
pro-Arab/Palestinian and lacks sensitivity about Israeli security
concerns.
In terms of the MEPP, it would be fair to assert
that EU had a decisive contribution in adopting some of the
most significant documents in the last few years. Three members
of the team that produced the Mitchel Report came from Europe.
The very Road map to peace was conceived by the Europeans.
Before it was adopted by the US, Russia and the UN, the Road
map was elaborated at an informal ministerial meeting of the
EU, held in Elsinor on August 30, 2002. Not surprisingly,
the Road map contains the EU position on the necessity to
define the end result of the peace process and a strict time
schedule for the resumption of the bilateral negotiations.
Many observers share the expectation that in
the immediate future the CFSP towards the Middle East will
be characterized by several distinct tendencies:
The EU will preserve its common position on
MEPP and will develop the mechanisms for policy implementation.
The new European Commission will help develop in greater detail
the European Neighborhood Policy and its Mediterranean dimension;
The EU will continue to urge the US Administration
to get closely involved in the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and in particular, in the implementation of the Road
map. The latter plan might need to be updated to reflect the
plans of the Israeli Government to withdraw from Gaza;
Alongside with the rest of the members of the
Quartet, the EU should consider possible support for the parties
in the conflict, in case they re-start meaningful negotiations
over the remaining open issues: the refugee problem, Jerusalem,
political and security borders;
The Palestinians would need financial and technical
assistance for the presidential and parliamentary elections.
The reform of the Palestinian Authority is an urgent necessity.
Like in 1996, the EU should try to assure access for its observers
to the elections. The European observers will not only contribute
to the conduct of free and fair elections, but will also create
a nucleus of foreign presence on the territories, that may
help ease the tensions;
A greater attention to public diplomacy campaigns
might help EU influence Israeli public opinion in a positive
manner. The European Union will have a chance to demonstrate
the European approach to security and peaceful development
of Israel, the future Palestinian state and the entire Middle
East.
* The author is a career
diplomat who had served several diplomatic assignments, including
the post of Charge d'Affairs a. i. in Israel. He teaches courses
in International Relations and Foreign Policy of Middle Eastern
Sates at Sofia University 'St. Kliment Ohridski" and
the New Bulgarian University.
** The article was accepted for publication
in December.
The Issue
of the Transparency and Accountability of CFSP/ESDP
Hristo Chorbadzhiyski
The goals and principles
of the European Union are laid down in the Treaty of the European
Union of 1993 (TEU). The accent in the Treaty's text is on
democratic values, freedom, the rule of law, human rights
and fundamental freedoms. But neither in this nor in the European
Communities Treaties, even in the Treaties of Amsterdam and
Nice, are the principles of transparency and accountability
of the EU's legislative and executive bodies introduced. Ten
years after the TEU, the European Union still experiences
a great democracy deficit in terms of transparency and accountability.
To a great extent the acts and the measures of the European
institutions are indistinct, yet secret. This applies to a
great extend to the work of the European Council and the Council
of the European Union (the Council) in the field of security
and defense: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and the European Security and Defense Policy.
What is the reason?
The EU incorporates two antagonistic decision-taking
models: a supranational method or the Community method ("the
first pillar" of the EU*) and intergovernmental cooperation
("the second and the third pillar" of the EU). The
decision-taking process under CFSP and Justice and Home Affaires
is a subject of the second method. The first method grants
the European Institutions with almost unlimited independence
in decision-making, while the decision-taking process under
the second method is realized through direct negotiations
between governmental representatives of the member states.
The decision-making with the Community method is mostly done
through close cooperation between the main EU institutions:
The Council of the European Union, the European Parliament
(EP) and the European Commission (EC) (co-decision-taking
process). The actual decision-making under the second method
is done within the European Council and the Council of the
European Union, which, depending on the issue under consideration,
is composed of the respective ministers of the member states,
e.g. ministers of foreign affaires, finance, etc. Furthermore,
in this case the decisions are taken on the basis of qualified
or absolute majority, the meetings are carried out behind
closed doors and each member state has a veto on issues of
high national importance.
The co-existence of these decision-taking models
is in many cases impossible and it obstructs the democratic
processes in the EU. As a direct consequence there is a trend
the Council to ignore the EP claims for the application of
transparency and accountability principles in the decision-making
processes and common policies' formulation and implementation.
The EP is the only directly elected institutional
body of the EU. The EP represents the peoples of the member
states and simultaneously it is a real embodiment of the supranational
method and democracy on supranational level. But even though
the EP is a legislative institution, it does not have the
responsibilities and functions as the national parliaments
of democratic states. These responsibilities and functions
so far are delegated to the indirectly elected EC and Council.
The scope of EP's acts is limited to recommendations to the
other European institutions and requirements for reports and
information on their acts and measures. Nevertheless, throughout
the 1990's there was a positive progress in this direction.
The EP was granted some additional rights in the decision-making
process.
CFSP
The CFSP is entirely a subject of the "intergovernmentilism."
In this sense the evolution from its establishment in 1993
(TEU) has been marked by the above-mentioned problem within
the EU's institutional framework. According to some analysts
the competing decision-making approaches, i.e. which institution
to gain control over the areas of foreign policy, security
and defense, the EC or the Council, and the EP's parallel
quest to enhance its role in the decision-making process lead
to an institutional building effect called 'brusselization."
In other words, while competencies in the areas of EU foreign
affairs, security and defense stay within the authority of
the member states, the formulation and implementation of the
common activities in these areas is "brusselized"
by recent intensive institution-building processes in Brussels
(European Defense Agency, Political and Security Committee,
Military Committee, Military Staff, Civilian Crisis Management
Committee, EU Foreign Minister, etc.). The question we face
here is: has there been an institutional evolution in the
EU's foreign affairs, security and defense, accompanied by
a parallel establishment of the tools and instruments providing
transparency and accountability of the CSFP and ESDP on supranational
level?
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the predecessor
of the ESDP, namely the European Political Cooperation, has
been criticized for having democracy shortcomings. Furthermore,
it seems that the democracy deficit in this area increased
following the introduction of he CSFP. The main reason for
that is the institution building process is not accompanied
by control mechanisms on an EU level.
The issues of democratic deficit in the CSFP
have been discussed throughout each reform of the European
Communities/EU Treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice). The
EP tried to influence this negative trend through its efforts
to make the debate on this issue more public. Practically,
the governments have the last say on the EU policies and institutional
reforms. The European Constitution debate was the next EP
opportunity to have an impact on the EU's democracy deficit.
Even though 16 EP members were involved in the EU Constitution's
elaboration as participants in the European Convent, national
governments ultimately had the final decision on final draft
The European Convent included 28 member states and candidate
states' representatives and 56 representatives of the national
parliaments of the member states and candidate states).
Although the Convent's foreign affairs and defense
working groups discussed the issue of transparency and accountability,
the final text of the European Constitution made few references
in this regard. The EP's role in CSFP is still limited (see
Article III-304). EP has the rights to require information
from the Council, the EC and the EU's Foreign Minister, as
well as to seek advice by these institutions. The EP does
not have any real power and control, neither role, in the
CSFP's implementation and formulation. The EP can debate twice
a year on the foreign policy aspects, issue declarations,
reports and resolutions, consult and advise the European Council
and the EC. Meanwhile the Council is not obliged to take into
account the EP's statements. The EP has no voice on EC's international
negotiations and commitments. Regarding the CSFP budget, the
EP has the right to approve or reject the expenses within
the overall EU budget.
Having in mind the democracy principles the
EU stands for, one might suggest that the EP should increase
its rights and responsibilities and the democracy deficit
will decrease. On the contrary. At this stage, the national
governments evidently obstruct such a trend. They fear the
EP engagement in the foreign, defense and security policies,
because, in their opinion, it will reflect on the effectiveness
of these policies. This is close to the "realist'"
vision of that secrecy and rapid and timely actions in the
area of security and defense does not come together with the
active involvement of parliaments. In addition, national governments
insist that democratic control over the CSFP does not mean
a real engagement of the EP in it. CSFP is established on
the basis of intergovernmental cooperation, i.e. its legitimacy
originates from member states' national sovereignty. In other
words, national parliaments are the institutional bodies,
which have rights to scrutinize the decisions of the respective
national governments. Practically, the result is an absence
of direct control mechanisms on supranational level over the
Council and the other EU institutions and bodies involved
in foreign, defense and security policy's formulation and
implementation.
In this sense one might reasonably ask the following
question: is the democracy deficit in the EU's foreign affaires,
security and defense issues a secondary negative result of
the European integration's processes or is it done on purpose?
Sometimes, governments tend to become more and more autonomous
from the societies they govern, especially when it comes to
security and defense issues. A government's readiness to delegate
responsibilities to a supranational organization in particular
area depends sometimes on its ambition to evade the society's
control. The latter, usually, in the face of the national
parliament.
ESDP
Since its establishment the ESDP is not subordinated to the
transparency and accountability principles. The EP does not
have any sufficient role in ESDP's implementation as well.
ESDP is a part of the CSFP, and respectively, of the EU's
"second pillar." ESDP is an entire subject of the
intergovernmentalism, i.e., it is a responsibility of the
Council and it is not accountable to the EP. During the EU
Constitution's elaboration the working group on defense came
to the conclusion that the specific essence of defense should
be taken into serious account when proposing the creation
of control and oversight mechanisms in this particular area.
As a result the draft Constitution introduced two references
on the EP's role in the EU defense. The first one extends
to a certain degree the EP's responsibility in CSFP. The second
reference concerns the national parliaments role rater than
the EP's in regard to defense issues in the EU. It points
out that the COSAC (Conference des Organes specializes en
Affaires communautaires), constituted of national parliaments'
delegates and European Parliament's delegates, will cooperate
with the EP and will organize inter-parliamentarian conferences,
which will have the sole responsibility to debate on common
defense issues. But neither of these two references was incorporated
into the final text of the European Constitution. According
to the paragraph referring to the ESDP (see Article III-309/310)
the EU Foreign Minister and a member state have the right
to make proposal on ESDP, and the decision-making is a main
responsibility of the Council. The EP is not mentioned at
all in the paragraphs concerning ESDP.
The reasons for the CSFP/ESDP's lack of
transparency and accountability are complex, but, more or
less, the main one is the combination of different government
and decision-making principles ("the three pillars").
In practice, the CSFP/ESDP architects ignore major democratic
principles for formulation and implementation of these policies.
Yet, CSFP/ESDP's transparency and accountability issue will
be of a growing importance. Although, limited in responsibilities
the EP is increasing its influence on the overall EU institutional
framework. The EP is the only directly elected EU institutional
body, thus it's the only body which could represent the EU
citizens' strong interest in EU's developments in foreign
affaires, security and defense, especially following the intervention
in Iraq, the terrorist attacks in Madrid, and the permanent
terrorist threats. Logically, the EU's measures in foreign
affairs, security and defense, sooner or later, should become
a subject of institutionalized democratic control in the face
of the more and more self-confident European Parliament. It
should be mentioned that two months ago the initial composition
of the European Commission was not approved by the European
Parliament - an example of the EP's intention to have a bigger
role in the EU's institutional framework.
* The Treaty of the EU introduced the so
called "temple construction" of the EU. It has three
pillars, as follows: European Communities, CSFP and Justice
and Home Affairs
Organizations
The Black Sea-Caspian Democratic Control
Consortium
http://harvard
-bssp.org/news/
http://kgi.edu.ua/cisss-ua
The Black Sea-Caspian Democratic Control Consortium
was founded on 27 November 2004 in Kiev by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) from eight countries from the Black Sea-Caspian
region (BSCR), incl. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia,
Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, on the initiative of
the Center for International Security and Strategic Studies
(CISSS), Ukraine.
Its chief objectives and priorities include:
- consolidation of the NGOs' efforts supporting
democratic transformations of the region;
- rapprochement of the positions of the participating countries
on democratic control (DC) and regional security;
- establishment of a system of effective monitoring over the
level of DC and the state of national and regional security
by the means of an identical methodology;
- development of a Security Sector (SS) Maturity Model and
elaboration of Methodology for SS Maturity Assessment;
- establishment of a network of the web-sites and periodicals
of the participating organizations and national institutions;
coordination of their activities and exchange of information,
incl. publication of the periodical of the Consortium "Democratic
Control and Regional Security";
- establishment of a Black Sea-Caspian Virtual Distributed
ADL College.
The Chairman of the BSCDCC is Prof. Alexander
Goncharenko, president of the CISSS, Ukraine. The Advisory
Council of the organization is composed of Members of the
European Parliament and the Parliament of Ukraine, senior
representatives of the Harvard University Black Sea Security
Program (USA), University of Kansas (USA), Carleton University
(Canada), the International Center for Policy Studies (Ukraine),
the Atlantic Council of Ukraine.
The National coordinator for Bulgaria in the
Consortium is George C. Marshal Association.
Association of the Officers in the Reserve
"Atlantic"
www.atlantic-bg.org
The Association of the Officers in the Reserve
"Atlantic" (AORA) is a Bulgarian non-governmental
organization striving to enhance national and international
security. The main goals of AORA are to:
- disseminate knowledge and experience on current security
and defense issues;
- support the development of sustainable and close relationships
between Bulgaria and the other NATO Member-countries in the
area of national and international security and defense;
- facilitate the democratic processes of defense and security
sector transformation;
- contribute to the development of democratic civil-military
relations;
- contribute to the development of effective parliamentarian
and civilian oversight of the security sector;
- support the effective contribution of reserve officers and
citizens to national security;
- assist the effective realization of reserve officers in
the civil society.
In order to achieve its goals the Association
organizes discussions, seminars, international events, elaborates,
publishes and disseminates particular information and analysis,
cooperates with national and international organizations,
institutions and experts.
Publications
and Projects
In this issue of the newsletter we
publish à paper prepared by former representatives from the
US legislative and executive branches, within a project implemented
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington
DC. The paper's goal is to propose guiding principle for Intelligence
Community reform. The paper below have been endorsed by David
Boren, Former Senator from Oklahoma, Bill Bradley, Former
Senator from New Jersey, Frank Carlucci, Former Secretary
of Defense, William Cohen, Former Secretary of Defense and
Senator from Maine, Robert Gates, Former Director of Central
Intelligence, John Hamre, Former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Gary Hart, Former Senator from Colorado, Henry Kissinger,
Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Sam
Nunn, Former Senator from Georgia, Warren Rudman, Former Senator
from New Hampshire, and George Shultz, Former Secretary of
State.
Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington DC
Guiding Principles for Intelligence Reform, September
21, 2004
http://www.csis.org/0409_IntelReformPrinciples.pdf
America's security depends on strengthening
our intelligence collection and analysis. Debate is under
way on intelligence reform, and harnessing the energy of an
election season is a healthy way to assure the issue receives
the attention it deserves. Racing to implement reforms on
an election timetable is precisely the wrong thing to do.
Intelligence reform is too complex and too important to undertake
at a campaign's breakneck speed. Based on our experience in
both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government
and on both sides of the political aisle, these are the basic
principles we believe should guide any reform effort:
Identify the Problems
Rushing in with solutions before we understand all the problems
is a recipe for failure. Only after a full appreciation of
the Intelligence Community's problems-and its strengths-can
sensible decisions be made about reform, including whether
to restructure. Moreover, reform will have to be comprehensive
to succeed. Addressing this or that shortcoming-however grave-in
isolation will fail to produce the improvement in intelligence
capabilities our nation's security demands.
Strengthen the Intelligence Community's
Leader
The individual responsible for leading the Intelligence Community
must be empowered with authority commensurate with his or
her responsibility. Specifically and crucially, future leaders
must have the ability to align personnel and resources with
national intelligence priorities. Whether we maintain the
Intelligence Community's current structure or create a new
one, we must ensure that the Intelligence Community's leader
has the tools to do his or her job.
Separate Intelligence from Policy
A fundamental principle for Intelligence Community reform
must be that the intelligence community remains independent
from policy-makers. Nothing could be more important to a healthy
national security structure. When intelligence and policy
are too closely tied, the demands of policy-makers can distort
intelligence and intelligence analysts can hijack the policy
development process. It is crucial to ensuring this separation
that the Intelligence Community leader has no policy role.
Otherwise, an Intelligence Community leader's voice could
overwhelm those of Cabinet secretaries and the National Security
Advisor and deprive the President of the benefit of robust,
informed policy debate. A single individual with the last
word on intelligence and a say in policy as well could be
a dangerously powerful actor in the national security arena-using
intelligence to advocate for particular policy positions,
budget requests, or weapons systems that others lacked the
knowledge to challenge. For this reason, the leader of the
Intelligence Community should not work inside the White House;
he or she should be at arm's length from the policy process,
not at the President's right hand. Nor should the leader become
an instrument of diplomacy or policy formulation; his or her
role should be to support others in these functions. Similarly,
Intelligence Community reform must not rob Cabinet secretaries
of their own ability to assess intelligence by centralizing
the bulk of assessment resources; the secretaries must be
able to turn to their own analysts for independent perspective
and be able to task the Intelligence Community leader for
input to the policy-making process. Finally, to protect against
an unhealthy mixing of functions, we believe the person who
is chosen to lead the Intelligence Community should be broadly
acceptable to both parties and chosen for his or her substantive
or management expertise.
Improve the Quality of Analysis
Intellectual conformity and failure of analytical imagination
have been the major culprits in most intelligence breakdowns,
from our failure to predict accurately India and Pakistan's
nuclear tests, to our misjudgment of Saddam Hussein's weapons
of mass destruction programs. Improving the quality of the
analysis on which policy makers rely must therefore be a top
reform priority. The best analysis emerges from a competitive
environment where different perspectives are welcomed and
alternative hypotheses are encouraged. Intelligence reform
must institutionalize these traits in the analytical process.
To preserve their independence, analysts must be insulated
from policy and political pressure. Finally, we must not only
concern ourselves with the appropriate structure of intelligence
analysis, we must also address the critical shortage of human
expertise in critical fields. Funding for programs to address
this deficiency is dangerously low and the trust funds for
the National Security Education Program will be fully depleted
within the next two years unless Congress acts.
Ensure More Effective Information-Sharing
Intelligence Community players have overwhelming cultural
and bureaucratic incentives not to share their information
with each other or with those outside the community. These
include a natural impulse to hoard information to protect
turf, and a deeply ingrained passion for secrecy. Domestic
agencies and foreign agencies, in particular, traditionally
have resisted sharing information with each other. Yet our
nation has learned with painful clarity that failure to share,
coordinate, and connect available intelligence can have devastating
consequences. The next time an FBI special agent suspects
an Arizona flight trainee is an al Qaeda terrorist, the Intelligence
Community needs to know. Reform must fundamentally alter agency
incentives and culture to require sharing. This must include
addressing the excessive emphasis on secrecy and classification
that inhibits constructive, timely information flows, while
continuing to respect the need to protect genuine sources
and methods.
Protect Civil Liberties
Collection of intelligence is inherently intrusive; spying
on fellow citizens carries with it great potential for abuse.
Even as we merge the domestic and foreign intelligence we
collect, we should not merge responsibility for collecting
it. Intelligence reform might well create a single strategic
coordinator of domestic and overseas collection on cross-border
threats like terrorism, but exclusive responsibility for authorizing
and overseeing the act of domestic intelligence collection
should remain with the Attorney General. This is the only
way to protect the rights of the American people upon whose
support a strong intelligence community depends.
Preserve Situational Awareness for Tactical
Military Operations
As we have seen from the skies over Bosnia to the sands and
cities of Afghanistan and Iraq, tactical intelligence and
situational awareness are indispensable to our military's
unparalleled operational success. Any successful intelligence
reform must respect the military's need to maintain a robust,
organic tactical intelligence capability and to have rapid
access to national intelligence assets and information.
Assure Clarity of Authority for Clandestine
Operations
The war on terrorism has blurred agency roles for some critical
national security activities. The Department of Defense now
performs more clandestine and intelligence operations than
in the past; meanwhile, the CIA's Directorate of Operations
engages more in traditional military functions, such as the
successful campaign in Afghanistan. Authority for these newer
roles is murky, and there are sometimes disparities in the
type or level of approval needed for an operation, depending
on who performs it. The new challenges we face mandate a wide
range of tools and creative approaches to intelligence. But
establishing absolute clarity of chain of command, oversight,
and accountability for clandestine operations is essential.
Reform Congressional Oversight Too
Intelligence reform will not succeed unless Congressional
oversight of the Intelligence Community becomes more effective
as well. Rather than relying on review of agency submissions
and after-the-fact investigation of failures or abuses, Congress
should reach out periodically to test and assure the Community's
health. Whether meaningful legislative oversight demands a
major overhaul of committee structure or merely a change of
philosophy, Congressional reform is as vital as changes affecting
the Executive Branch.
Elections are a perfect time for debate, but
a terrible time for decision-making. When it comes to intelligence
reform, Americans should not settle for adjustments that are
driven by the calendar instead of common sense; they deserve
a thoughtful, comprehensive approach to these critical issues.
If, as seems likely, Congress considers it essential to act
now on certain structural reforms, we believe it has an obligation
to return to this issue early next year in the 109th Congress
to address these issues more comprehensively. We hope the
principles we've suggested will help shape serious discussion
of reform.
Operations Research Support to Force and
Operations Planning in the New Security Environment
NATO Science for Peace Project SFP-981149 for building
new capabilities in Decision Making Support for the Bulgarian
Security Sector
In the beginning of the 21st Century NATO members
and partner countries face a major challenge - to transform
their military and security organizations to deal effectively
with terrorist threats, proliferation of WMD, organized crime,
cyber attacks on critical services and infrastructure, etc.
Countries need to organize, equip and train security forces
that would smoothly interact-among themselves, as well as
with forces from other nations and with non-governmental organizations-in
order to prevent and react to a broad spectrum of threats
and challenges.
To this purpose, the project aims to provide
timely and effective scientific support, drawing on existing
and developing novel operations research methods and models,
in order to meet current and anticipated needs of end users
from defense establishments, ministries of interior, and civil
protection agencies both in decision making process / change
management and support of computer aided exercises. In addition,
project results will be incorporated in the curricula of Bulgaria's
Defense and Staff College and the Academy of the Ministry
of the Interior.
Bulgaria will establish a Center of Excellence
in Operations Research (OR), attracting promising young scientists,
conducting cutting-edge research on force and security-sector
transformation and network-enabled operations, and facilitating
the integration within the NATO's OR community.
This project networks the supplementary capabilities
of several academic and research organizations from Bulgaria
(the C4ISR Laboratory of the Space Research Institute and
the Operations Research Department of the Institute of Mathematics
and Informatics, both at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
supported by many other institutes as Institute for Parallel
Processing, and the Defense and Force Management Department
of the Rakovsky Defense and Staff College), from Germany (Niemeyer
Operations Analyses) and The Netherlands (the Operations Research
and Business Management Division at the Institute for Applied
Scientific Research on Defense, Security and Safety). Associate
Professor Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, Sofia, Bulgaria, and Mr.
Klaus Niemeyer, Ottobrunn, Germany, are the Principal Project
Co-Directors. The project will last for 3 years and is supported
with approximately 300 000 Euro from the NATO Science Committee.
Early Warning and Policy Perspectives
in the Transatlantic Security Agenda:
Central and East European Point of View
The Final Conference of the Project on Early
Warning and Policy Perspectives in the Transatlantic Security
Agenda: Central and East European Point of View was held on
November 13, 2004 in Sofia. The initiative of the Atlantic
Club-Bulgaria, funded by the German Marshall Fund of the United
States was supported by a number of non-governmental partners
from Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and the United States.
The principal objectives of the project were
to:
- identify the roots, strategic motives and
perspectives of the growing divergence between the US and
its European allies over important security issues and especially
over the central role of NATO as the primary transatlantic
political-security-military institution;
- to consider the impact of the disagreement and diversification
on the emerging Central and East European partners of NATO
and the EU Member-states,
- contribute to overcoming the strategic security differences
within the Euro-Atlantic community, including the definition
of the areas of needed priority of cooperation; preserving
Trans-Atlantic solidarity and effectiveness in the activities
in South East Europe, in the Black Sea region and elsewhere.
The final product of the project included:
- a review of the current status of the transatlantic
relations;
- a multifactor methodological framework evaluating the impact
of different crisis generating developments (such as NATO's
Kosovo campaign, the US operation in Iraq, the case of International
Criminal Court, the establishment of Common European Security
and Defense Policy, etc.) on both the Euro-Atlantic cohesion
and the pro-Western attitudes of Central and East Europeans.
- a Methodological Framework on Early Warning and Policy Perspectives
in the Transatlantic Security Agenda - Central and East European
point of view.
The basic results from the project could serve
as methodological and organizational background for further
systematic monitoring and support of comprehensive national
policies coordinated and aimed at making the CEE countries
contribution to Euro-Atlantic relations' vitality and effectiveness.
One Year after the Revolution of Roses:
Achievements and Failures.
Can Georgia be One of the New Democracies?
The Center for Liberal Strategies (CLS) has
recently completed a project aimed at transferring the lessons
learned in the Balkans to Georgian decision makers, leading
journalists and civic activists, in order to help ensure the
success of the political and the economic reform in Georgia.
A group of experts from Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia led
by the former Bulgarian Prime-Minister Philip Dimitrov shared
the positive and negative Balkan experience in implementing
reforms in post-crisis societies by highlighting the importance
of the speed of the reforms in ensuring their success.
In the first two trips to Georgia, in June and
October 2004, the group met with several members of the Georgian
Government, with members of Parliament and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and media representatives. As a result
of these talks an international conference in Tbilisi was
initiated, which was organized by the CLS and a coalition
of Georgian NGOs. The conference titled One Year after the
Revolution of Roses: Achievements and Failures. Can Georgia
be One of the New Democracies? took place on December 17,
2004. It was attended by: Philip Dimitrov, Former Prime Minister
of Bulgaria; Goran Svilanovic, Former Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro; Tom Dine, President of Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Bozidar Djelic, Former Minister
of Finance, Serbia; Ognyan Minchev, Institute for Regional
and International Studies, Bulgaria; Associate Professor Dr.
Velizar Shalamanov, Former Deputy-Minister of Defense of Bulgaria;
Slobodan Djinovic, Former Leader of Otpor, Serbia; Deyan Kiuranov
and Vessela Tcherneva, Center for Liberal Strategies, Bulgaria.
The foreign participants were received by the President of
Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili.
On the Georgian side in the conference participated:
Maia Nadiradze, Majority Leader in the Georgian Parliament;
Giorgi Baramidze, Vice Premier, State Minister, Georgia; Sozar
Subeliany, Public Defender of Georgia; Giga Bokeria, Member
of Georgian Parliament; Zurab Adeishvili, Prosecutor-General
of Georgia; David Zurabishvili, Parliament of Georgia; as
well as a broad range of representatives of the Parliament,
the NGOs, media and foreign missions.
The foreign attendees emphasized the need for
reformist governments to gain and sustain public support and
not take it for granted, while aiming at increasing the awareness
of decision-makers of the impediments they will face in undertaking
painful reforms. The group also focused on the importance
of an open dialogue between the governmental institutions,
media and civil society and of coalition building in ensuring
the success of reforms. A key point of discussion both with
government representatives and opposition Members of parliaments
was underlining the responsibility of the new government to
safeguard human rights and legal norms while it undertakes
painful political and economic reforms, in order not to alienate
the public. The project aimed at raising the awareness of
the international community of the priority areas for assistance,
which will help ensure the success of Georgian reforms.
The White Paper of Civil Protection of
the Republic of Bulgaria
Contribution to the Security Strategy of the Republic
of Bulgaria
The White Paper of Civil Protection of the Republic
of Bulgaria Project was completed in December 2004. The project
was implemented by the Center for National Security and Defense
Studies (CNSDS) at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences by a
team headed by Associate Professor Dr. Velizar Shalamanov.
The main goal of the study was to assess the status and prospects
ahead of the system for the protection of population and critical
infrastructure with the participation of foreign experts,
as well as to formulate a concept for the development of the
system and thus assist the Permanent Committee for Protection
of the Population Against Natural Disasters, Accidents and
Emergencies (PCPPNDAE) with the Council of Ministers.
The fundamental principles of the Concept for
Civil Security of the Republic of Bulgaria have been formulated
as a part of the project within the context of the establishment
of an integrated security sector. An institutionalized civil
security system is considered "the third pillar"
of the security sector in Bulgaria. This system includes both
the "traditional" civil protection and the crises
response system, which are to be regulated by the Crises Management
Act. The expert team has reached the conclusion that active
civil participation (mainly through volunteer formations)
is the connection between the "traditional" civil
protection and civil security.
The civil security concept foundations are formulated
also based on an analysis of the existing models of civil
security within the frameworks of the EU and US. The term
civil security is suggested as the Bulgarian equivalent to
the term homeland security, adopted in the US, and civil (societal)
security, adopted in many EU countries. Due attention is paid
to the tendency of transformation of civil security system
in many European countries targeted at the establishment of
an independent unit outside the Ministry of Defense or of
the Interior, which is to execute the powers in this area
and coordinate the work of all other government authorities
in case of emergency situations, natural disasters and accidents.
The White Paper of Civil Protection contains
a detailed reference of the possible risks for both population
and infrastructure. A comprehensive analysis of the current
status of organizational structures within the civil protection
system points to a number of weaknesses (particularly in interdepartmental
coordination and the lack of strategic forecasts and planning).
The expert team behind the White Paper of Civil
Protection suggests three fundamental alternatives for the
development of the system for the protection of population
and infrastructure. The first alternative lies in a narrow
interpretation and application of the Crises Management Act.
This alternative envisages the establishment of a crises response
system compliant with the Act - a National Center for Crises
Management with the Security Council of the Council of Ministers,
as well as Security Councils with the central and local government
authorities. The main weaknesses of this alternative are the
narrow range of covered risks, as well as the danger that
traditional "power" ministries could obsess the
initiative within the crises management system and dominate
over the structures for the protection of civilians and infrastructure.
The second fundamental alternative, suggested
in the White Paper, offers a broader interpretation and application
of the Crises Management Act. This alternative envisages maximum
interdepartmental coordination, which includes also the coordination
plans for the expansion of the capacities for protection of
population and critical infrastructure of several agencies.
The second fundamental alternative is considered to be "a
quasi ministry, whereas a ministry is not actually established."
Its major advantage is the higher extent of integration of
the crises response system and the existing structure for
population and infrastructure protection.
The third fundamental alternative, formulated
in the White Paper, envisages the establishment of a new Ministry
of Civil Security.This ministry should include organizational
units based on three existing state agencies - Civil Protection
State Agency, State Agency for Refugees and State Reserve
and Wartime Stocks State Agency. This alternative envisages
the establishment of a new Civil Security Services Agency
within the new Ministry, which is to coordinate and control
the work of paramilitary volunteer formations (Civil Security
Services) with the regional governors.
The White Paper analyses each of these alternatives
also from a legal perspective issuing recommendations for
concrete legislative changes. The fundamental points of a
special Population and Infrastructure Protection Act are formulated
and are envisaged to regulate the activity, rights and obligations
of the units within the civil security system.
Black Sea Initiative project for Civil
Military Emergency Planning
The Black Sea Initiative (BSI) project for
Civil Military Emergency Planning was endorsed at an exploratory
conference, initiated by Bulgaria held in Wiesbaden, Germany
in August 2004. The participating countries include the Black
Sea littoral states - Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania,
Turkey and Ukraine. Though invited, Russia does not participate
until now. The United States support the BSI providing the
logistics and expertise.
The goal of the Initiative is to facilitate
the cooperation among the participating countries and the
coordination of all the available assets for any disaster.
It will focus on the issues of Black Sea commercial
ports, the protection of population in port and harbor areas
in the region, identifying primary risks/threats thereto,
including the possible weapons of mass destruction considerations,
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high yield conventional
explosives potentialities and natural disaster threats as
well as and the consequential effects on the populations involved.
The parameters of the BSI will further be defined
on the basis of the experience of its three working groups
(Information/Management Technology, Standards and Procedures,
Planning and Exercises) and the envisaged model top table
exercises (TTE). The general methodology of the initiative
is that civil protection TTE approach should be used.
The First BSI Conference was hosted by the Bulgarian
Civil Protection State Agency in Varna, in October 2004. Five
of the Black Sea littoral states inl. Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania,
Turkey and Ukraine took part in the conference. The expert
support was provided by the United States.
The Conference addressed common risks to populations
in port and harbor areas of the Black Sea; the use of the
international procedures established by the United Nations
(UNOCHA-MCDA), NATO (EADRCC), and the European Union in current
plans and the ways model table top exercises could be used
to elevate and improve these plans.
The first BSI TTE "Tomis International
2005" will be held in September 2005 in Constanta, Romania.
Events
| 13 November |
Final Conference of the Project
on Early Warning and Policy Perspectives in the Transatlantic
Security Agenda: Central and East European Point of View
(Sofia, Bulgaria) |
|
|
| 25 November |
Bulgaria's Membership in NATO
and the European Union and the Balkan's Euro-Atlantic
Future, International Conference, organized in Sofia by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense,
the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria and the Open Society Institute
- Sofia (Sofia, Bulgaria) |
|
|
| 27 November |
The Black Sea-Caspian Democratic
Control Consortium was founded by a number of non-governmental
organizations from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia,
Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine, on the initiative
of the Ukrainian Center for International Security and
Strategic Studies (Kiev, Ukraine) |
|
|
| 3-4 December |
Meeting of the Security Sector
Reform Working Group of the PfP Consortium (Budapest,
Hungary) |
|
|
| 15 December |
The outcomes of the US Presidential
elections and its effect on the US Policies in the SEE
and the Black Sea region, round table organized by Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Security
and the US Government Democracy Commission (Sofia, Bulgaria) |
| |
|
| 17 December |
One year after the Revolution
of roses: Achievements and failures. Can Georgia be one
of the New democracies? International conference organized
by the Center for Liberal Strategies-Bulgaria and a number
of Georgian non-governmental organizations (Tbilisi, Georgia) |
| |
|
| 20 December |
Officers in the Reserve - a
bridge between the armed forces and the civil society,
round table organized by the Association of the Officers
in the Reserve "Atlantic" and the US Government
Democracy Commission (Plovdiv) |
|
Security Focus 